The
last month has seen a remarkable series of events
that focused the public and news media on America's
shortcomings in dealing with terrorism from radical
Islamists. This catharsis, which is not yet over,
is necessary for our national psyche. If we learn
the right lessons, it may also prove to be an
essential part of our future victory over those
who now threaten us.
But
how do we select the right lessons to learn? I
tried to suggest some in my recent book, and many
have attempted to do so in the 9/11 hearings,
but such efforts have been largely eclipsed by
partisan reaction.
One
lesson is that even though we are the world's
only remaining superpower - as we were before
Sept. 11, 2001 - we are seriously threatened by
an ideological war within Islam. It is a civil
war in which a radical Islamist faction is striking
out at the West and at moderate Muslims. Once
we recognize that the struggle within Islam -
not a "clash of civilizations" between East and
West - is the phenomenon with which we must grapple,
we can begin to develop a strategy and tactics
for doing so. It is a battle not only of bombs
and bullets, but chiefly of ideas. It is a war
that we are losing, as more and more of the Islamic
world develops antipathy toward the United States
and some even develop a respect for the jihadist
movement.
I
do not pretend to know the formula for winning
that ideological war. But I do know that we cannot
win it without significant help from our Muslim
friends, and that many of our recent actions (chiefly
the invasion of Iraq) have made it far more difficult
to obtain that cooperation and to achieve credibility.
What
we have tried in the war of ideas has also fallen
short. It is clear that United States government
versions of MTV or CNN in Arabic will not put
a dent in the popularity of the anti-American
jihad. Nor will calls from Washington for democratization
in the Arab world help if such calls originate
from a leader who is trying to impose democracy
on an Arab country at the point of an American
bayonet. The Bush administration's much-vaunted
Middle East democracy initiative, therefore, was
dead on arrival.
We
must also be careful, while advocating democracy
in the region, that we do not undermine the existing
regimes without having a game plan for what should
follow them and how to get there. The lesson of
President Jimmy Carter's abandonment of the shah
of Iran in 1979 should be a warning. So, too,
should we be chastened by the costs of eliminating
the regime of Saddam Hussein, almost 25 years
after the shah, also without a detailed plan for
what would follow.
Other
parts of the war of ideas include making real
progress on the Israel-Palestinian issue, while
safe-guarding Israeli security, and finding ideological
and religious counter-weights to Osama bin Laden
and the radical imams. Fashioning a comprehensive
strategy to win the battle of ideas should be
given as much attention as any other aspect of
the war on terrorists, or else we will fight this
war for the foreseeable future. For even when
Osama bin Laden is dead, his ideas will carry
on. Even as Al Qaeda has had its leadership attacked,
it has morphed into a hydra, carrying out more
major attacks in the 30 months since 9/11 than
it did in the three years before.
The
second major lesson of the last month of controversy
is that the organizations entrusted with law enforcement
and intelligence in the United States had not
fully accepted the gravity of the threat prior
to 9/11. Because this is now so clear, there will
be a tendency to overemphasize organizational
fixes. The 9/11 commission and President Bush
seem to be in a race to propose creating a "director
of national intelligence," who would be given
control over all American intelligence agencies.
The commission may also recommend a domestic security
intelligence service, probably modeled on Britain's
MI-5.
While
some structural changes are necessary, they are
a small part of the solution. And there is a risk
that concentrating on chain-of-authority diagrams
of federal agencies will further divert our attention
from more important parts of the agenda. This
new director of national intelligence would be
able to make only marginal changes to agency budgets
and interactions. The more important task is improving
the quality of the analysts, agents and managers
at the lead foreign intelligence agency, the Central
Intelligence Agency.
In
addition, no new domestic security intelligence
service could leap full grown from the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and the Department of
Homeland Security. Indeed, creating another new
organization while we are in a key phase in the
war on terrorism would ignore the lesson that
we should have learned from the creation of Homeland
Security. Many observers, including some in the
new department, now agree that the forced integration
and reorganization of 22 agencies diverted attention
from the missions of several agencies that were
needed to go after the terrorists and to reduce
our vulnerabilities at home.
We
do not need another new agency right now. We do,
however, need to create within the F.B.I. a strong
organization that is vastly different from the
federal police agency that was unable to notice
the Al Qaeda presence in America before 9/11.
For now, any American version of MI-5 must be
a branch within the F.B.I. - one with a higher
quality of analysts, agents and managers.
Rather
than creating new organizations, we need to give
the C.I.A. and F.B.I. makeovers. They cannot continue
to be dominated by careerists who have carefully
managed their promotions and ensured their retirement
benefits by avoiding risk and innovation for decades.
The agencies need regular infusions throughout
their supervisory ranks of managers and thinkers
from other, more creative organizational cultures.
In
the new F.B.I., marksmanship, arrests and skill
on the physical training obstacle course should
no longer be prerequisites for recruitment and
retention. Similarly, within the C.I.A. we should
quash the belief that - as George Tenet, the director
of central intelligence, told the 9/11 commission
- those who have never worked in the directorate
of operations cannot understand it and are unqualified
to criticize it.
Finally,
we must try to achieve a level of public discourse
on these issues that is simultaneously energetic
and mutually respectful. I hoped, through my book
and testimony, to make criticism of the conduct
of the war on terrorism and the separate war in
Iraq more active and legitimate. We need public
debate if we are to succeed. We should not dismiss
critics through character assassination, nor should
we besmirch advocates of the Patriot Act as fascists.
We
all want to defeat the jihadists. To do that,
we need to encourage an active, critical and analytical
debate in America about how that will best be
done. And if there is another major terrorist
attack in this country, we must not panic or stifle
debate as we did for too long after 9/11.
Richard
A. Clarke, former head of counterterrorism at
the National Security Council, is the author of
"Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on
Terror."
Topplebush.com
Posted: May 2, 2004
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